


SIXTH EDITION

Licensed to:

Comparative Politics

Domestic Responses to Global Challenges

CHARLES HAUSS



**Comparative Politics: Responses to
Global Challenges, Sixth Edition**

Charles Hauss

Executive Editor: Carolyn Merrill

Development Editor: Rebecca Green

Editorial Assistant: Katherine Hayes

Associate Development Project Manager:
Lee McCracken

Senior Marketing Manager: Trent Whatcott

Marketing Assistant: Aimee Lewis

Marketing Communications Manager:
Heather Baxley

Senior Content Project Manager: Josh Allen

Art Director: Linda Helcher

Print Buyer: Karen Hunt

Permissions Editor: Bob Kauser

Production Service: Matrix Productions

Art Editor: Don Schlotman

Printer: R.R. Donnelley/Willard

Cover Images: © Photographers Choice/
Media Bakery; Dimitri Vervitiotis/Digital
Vision/© Getty Images; © Red Chopsticks/
Media Bakery; Jack Hollingsworth/
Photodisc/© Getty Images

© 2009 Cengage Learning

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein may be reproduced, transmitted, stored, or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to photocopying, recording, scanning, digitizing, taping, Web distribution, information networks, or information storage and retrieval systems, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2007935511

For product information and technology assistance, contact us at
Cengage Learning Academic Resource Center, 1-800-423-0563

For permission to use material from this text or product,
submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions.

Further permissions questions can be e-mailed to
permissionrequest@cengage.com.

Student Edition:

ISBN-13: 978-0-495-50109-1

ISBN-10: 0-495-50109-3

Casebound Edition:

ISBN-13: 978-0-495-56552-9

ISBN-10: 0-495-56552-0

Cengage Learning

10 Davis Drive
Belmont, CA 94002-3098
USA

Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by
Nelson Education, Ltd.

For your course and learning solutions, visit academic.cengage.com.

Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred
online store www.ichapters.com.



CHAPTER OUTLINE

- Go Sell Shoes
- What Is Comparative Politics
- The State: One Focus Among Many
- Three Templates
- A World in Crisis?
- Using This Book

The voyage of discovery consists of not seeking new lands but in seeing with new eyes.

MARCEL PROUST

1

CHAPTER

Seeking New Lands, Seeing with New Eyes

GO SELL SHOES

Figuring out how to start a book like this one is always an author's toughest challenge.

This time, I got lucky.

Five things happened in early 2007 that gave me a way to start the book and also discuss core concepts in comparative politics.

Chuck Hagel

In the first days of the 2008 American presidential election campaign, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska) was confronted by some of his Republican colleagues who demanded that he explain why he might defy his president and oppose the escalation of the war in Iraq.

After appearing on one of the Sunday morning television talk shows, he ran the gauntlet of reporters outside the studio. It was hard to tell from the tape of the episode, but he seems to have gotten a bit frustrated with the press and told one of reporters, "if you want a safe job, go sell shoes. This is a tough business."

In short, Hagel made it clear that he understood that politics is a rough and tumble world. Anyone in his position in almost any country has to expect to not only be

grilled by the media but to be attacked from critics coming from all points on the political spectrum. Selling shoes or, for that matter, almost anything else, seemed far easier to him than running for president or any other political office. He decided not to run either for President or for re-election to the Senate. . . .

Obama and Clinton

On the Democratic side, Americans faced something new in their political life—an African-American and a woman were leading the race for their party's nomination. Senator Obama spoke at George Mason University (where I teach) a few days before he officially declared his candidacy. I went to hear him—along with 1,200 of my favorite students and friends. He was spellbinding. So was Hillary Clinton during her appearances that winter.

As I taught that semester, I saw something that actually surprised me. Most of my students thought it was perfectly normal that a woman and a person of color could be serious candidates.

Stiletto Heels and Dynamite

That same spring, French voters went to the polls to choose a new president in an election that would mark the end of an era in which politicians first elected in the 1950s

Senator Obama at George Mason, Feb 2007.



© Michael Temchine/Newhouse News Service/Landov

and 1960s had dominated political life for two generations. The top two candidates were new on political center stage.

Nicolas Sarkozy had been a prominent conservative politician for a number of years, but gained a major office for the first time in 2002 when he was named Minister of the Interior, which placed him in charge of most aspects of law and order. He made a reputation for taking a tough stand on crime and immigration, including calling many teenaged and non-white protesters in Paris's tough suburbs, scum. The Socialist candidate, Ségolène Royal, was the first woman to be a serious candidate for the presidency. Her political views were not all that well known to most voters. But her sense of fashion was known by most voters, including her penchant for wearing stiletto heels.

So, a few weeks before the election, one of the news weeklies had a cover that only had a pair of heels and some lit sticks of dynamite, which many people felt epitomized Sarkozy's political personality. In the end, Sarkozy won easily. However, his victory should not be seen as more of the same, another Gaullist succeeding President Chirac.

Sarkozy is the first person of his generation to win the presidency. And, his cabinet of half men and half women, including the socialist Bernard Kouchner as foreign minister suggests that much will change in the next five years.

Nigeria: From the Military to the Military?

On the same weekend that the French went to the polls, Nigerians did too.

Their election was different. Outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo had finished his second term and was barred from running again. Obasanjo was no normal democratic president. In 1975, he replaced a fellow general as head of a military government, following his predecessor's assassination. Four years later, he became the first military ruler of Nigeria (there have been many) to hand power back to civilians with the creation of the Second Republic. It barely survived four years. In 1999, Nigerians formed yet another republic and Obasanjo, now a civilian, was elected to be its first president. Obasanjo had built a reputation during the previous twenty years as a leader with integrity, including helping create Transparency International, an organization that fights corruption worldwide. But, in his eight years in power, high ranking officials, including his vice president were accused of corruption.

As the 2007 campaign unfolded, the one serious opponent of Obasanjo's designated successor was another former general and military dictator. When the Nigerians went to the polls, Muhammed Buhari only won about a quarter of the vote, losing to Obasanjo's preferred candidate, Umaru Yar'Adua.

In the countries we will cover in Part 2, elections are rarely major milestones. The contest in Nigeria in 2007



Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal, 2 May 2007 debate.

© Philippe Wojazer/Reuters/Landov

marked the first time that the presidency passed from one man to another without much of a chance of a military or other sort of coup.

New President Yar'Adua won almost two thirds of the vote even though he was little known outside his home region in the Muslim dominated north. Unlike the United States, Britain, or France, President Yar'Adua will have to deal not only with his own support base but also whether the Nigerian public will support their Fourth Republic.



© Afolabi Sotunde/Reuters/Landov

2007 Nigerian presidential inauguration.

Putin 2.5?

Just before this book is published, Russia will hold its fourth election since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Like Obasanjo, President Vladimir Putin cannot run for a third term.

However, he might sit on the sidelines and have one of his supporters run and then resign after a few months in office. Or, as seems to be the case just as we went to press, Putin will probably reemerge as prime minister after he steps down as president and run the country from that office, which has not been a major force in Russian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And therein lies the most important lesson of this section and the book as a whole. The stakes of political life do vary from time to time and place to place. Leadership selection in the United States, France, or Britain demonstrating that shifts in leadership in the industrialized democracies usually pass smoothly.

As we will see in Parts 3 and 4, that is not the case in the rest of the world.

WHAT IS COMPARATIVE POLITICS?

No five vignettes can cover the entirety of comparative politics or any other academic discipline.

Nonetheless, these do show us the three premises on which this book is based. They also open the intellectual door to comparative politics as a whole.

The first of those themes should be obvious already. Events taking place around the world affect us all. Whoever wins the American presidency in 2008 will have to deal with problems and threats from around the world. The relationship between the United States and traditional allies such as France have been frayed since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the wars the Bush administration launched in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nigeria supplies at least 10 percent of the oil consumed in the United States. Viewed from the other perspective, Americans buy about 40 percent of Nigerian oil and gas.

We will see dozens of other issues in the pages that follow. But the bottom line should already be clear. Politics around the world matters.

Second, the stakes of political life vary tremendously from place to place and time to time. The French and American presidential elections are high stakes affairs. The winners will have to tackle some of the world's thorniest issues.

That said, the stakes in Nigeria and most of the rest of the countries we will consider in Parts 3 and 4 are higher.

Content

The vignettes should have given you a good first glimpse at *what* comparativists study. In the simplest terms, we try to understand the similarities and differences we find among national governments and other political units around the world.

That may seem simple, but as it should also be clear by now, we have a bewildering array of political issues to be concerned about. There are well over 190 countries all of which are unique. Then, we have to worry about elections, as was the case in each of the examples. However, that is just the tip of "iceberg" of topics you will have to deal with this term. We will also see welfare states, identity based conflict, terrorism, the environment, the status of women and racial minorities, and a whole lot more.

Indeed, there is such diversity in political life that, if we just focused on contentious issues such as these, you would have a hard time retaining the material on any one country, let alone on the group of them your instructor will cover. To be sure, elections, conflict resolution, economic policy making, and the like are what drew most of us to politics and political science in the first place.

But, they are not enough.

All the News That Fits We Print

To see that there has to be more than factual information in comparative politics, you can do a simple comparison.

The *New York Times* claims that it includes "all the news that is fit to print" on its masthead. Not so.

Get today's copies of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, both of which are available on line (www.nytimes.com and www.washingtonpost.com). It will become clear all but immediately that the two papers are dramatically different. The *Times* puts international news at the beginning of its first section and follows it with American national issues. The *Post* starts with U.S. domestic politics and then has a far shorter section on international news than the *Times*. After all, the *Post* is the "home town" newspaper for the most powerful capital city in the world. Even its Style section has a lot of political stories.

Furthermore, the *Times* masthead's statement is misleading because all the news that is fit to print doesn't make it in the paper. Until 2006, it had little coverage of the genocide in Darfur. Indeed, the paper only has a handful of full time correspondents in Africa as a whole, and it has more than any of its competitors.

In fact, the rule of thumb might be that these papers include all the news that fits around all the advertisements they have to run to turn a profit.

Method

The poor job covering international politics and news by even some of the most esteemed newspapers in the United States demonstrates why comparative politics is doubly important. In addition to shedding light on these and other controversial issues, it also gives us a lens to use in understanding the confusing array of political phenomena that befuddle even those of us who have spent our entire professional careers as teachers, scholars, and/or activists.

On one level, comparative politics is simple. After all, we have all compared. Which college to go to? Which car to buy? Or MP3 player? Mac or Windows? We may not always make the best decisions. Nonetheless, the judgments that we make invariably involve comparisons.

I wrote this passage on my 15" PowerBook. I have a bigger screen on my desktop, but it was the first sunny day in the spring, so I wanted to work on my deck. First comparison: inside or outside? Second comparison, why do I use a Mac? In 1984 when I bought my first computer, Macs were a lot easier to use. Twenty some desktops and laptops later, I've never seen the need to change. Were I making that comparison today, I might actually buy a Windows machine. Vista is almost as good as Mac OSX, and you can buy a Windows machine for a lot less. Third comparison: why a 15" screen rather than the 12" ones my students bring to class. Simple, as I get older, my eyesight is not what it was when I was twenty. Big screens (and big fonts) help.

The logic behind comparative politics is not hard to see. I can learn more about something if I contrast it with

something else of the same ilk. When I was in high school, my parents took me on a tour of twenty or more college campuses. I ruled out some immediately. Too big. Not coed. I applied to ten and then got into a depressingly small number of them. I still had to choose among three or four colleges. In other words, I had to compare again. I ended up at the right place, though for all of the wrong reasons.

Of course, we are interested in comparing political phenomena, not colleges or computers. There is an extensive and often complicated literature on what it takes to do comparative political analysis. In practice, however, it is just about as easy to compare political phenomena as colleges or computers.

To take but one obvious example, when George W. Bush had to choose a running mate in 2000, he compared Dick Cheney with a number of other possible candidates and decided that someone with Cheney's vast experience, including service in the first President Bush's cabinet, would give his ticket the balance it needed.

Or, consider the following simple example from the 2005 British general election. A total of 53 percent of registered voters cast their ballots. That one fact tells you very little about Britain or its political system. But the picture changes dramatically once you add two more pieces of information that allow you to compare Britain over time. It was the lowest turnout since 1935. By contrast, it is rare that many registered voters vote in American presidential elections.

With those two pieces of comparative data, you can learn a lot more and can pose far more insightful questions about elections in general. For example, why is turnout in British elections normally higher than that in the United States? Why has it been declining in recent elections? What difference does turnout make? Did the fact that only a quarter of the people voted for the Labour Party make it easier or harder for Prime Minister Blair to meet the challenges of what would be his final term in office?

In sum, comparing doesn't make us brilliant, but it does allow us to put the academic, commercial, and political options open to us in a broader and potentially useful analytical perspective.

Science

My colleagues and I call ourselves political scientists. It's a pretentious title since we have little in common with physicists or chemists with their fancy labs and huge research grants.

But, in two important ways we share a similar worldview. On the first level, our job is to find general explanations for the often narrow phenomena we study. How does growing bean plants (which many of you had to do in biology classes) help us understand the way plants mature?

Or, how do elections around the world help us understand the role average people play in political life?

Science, then, is an attempt to develop a **theory** that covers an entire discipline, something often referred to as a **paradigm**.¹ Given the complexity of politics around the world, no single and universally accepted theory is likely to emerge in your lifetime or mine. Nonetheless, designing new and better theories is something we can all do, including students in introductory classes.

In this sense, "science" means moving upward in what the psychologist Chris Argyris called the ladder of inference. You will be reading about a number of countries. Your instructor will ask you a question like this one: "of what is Germany an instance?" Hopefully he or she will phrase it better. But, the point of such questions is clear. How do we move from a handful of examples to regional, if not global, conclusions?

On the second level, we work more deductively. From this perspective, we focus on a hypothesis or a guess that cannot be proven. Political scientists test it using data they have gathered systematically. Such data can never prove a theory is true. However compelling the evidence might seem, there could be other cases and other times in which the theory is not confirmed.

Rather, the most interesting thing we can do is **falsify** the theory by finding at least one example in which it does not hold true. Then, we have to try to figure out why that was the case. That, in turn, usually means stepping back from the computer screen or pile of printout and thinking creatively.

Whether we work inductively or deductively, the goal is the same. How do we reach general conclusions about the political world even if we know full well that future events will prove us wrong?

THE STATE: ONE FOCUS AMONG MANY

The discussion so far might seem more than a little abstract. Therefore, what we will do in the rest of this chapter is to bring everything from the politics of these countries and the ideas of science down to earth in three sections.

This one will focus on the **state** that will be the focus of the book. It will not be the only concept we concentrate on, but it is the most important. The next one will consider a number of core concepts in comparative politics. The third

¹Terms in boldface can be found in the list of key terms at the end of each chapter and in the glossaries of concept, people, acronyms, organizations, places, and events at the end of the book.

will introduce three templates that you can use to guide your way through the counties and ideas that follow.

Political scientists do not agree on what the best focus of a text or course should be. I have chosen to organize this book around the evolution, structure, and performance of the state. Others have chosen to concentrate on public policy, the political economy, the role of average citizens, and the overall performance of the system as a whole.

I decided to focus on the state because it puts one of the most important questions in political life on center stage—the way scarce resources are allocated. That, in turn, means focusing on the single most important common denominator of political life—**power**, which is most often defined as the ability to get people or groups to do *what they otherwise would not do*. Those last six words are key. They suggest that the exercise of power requires coercion. People typically have to be forced into doing things they don't want to do. The exercise of power does not always involve the use of physical force, but the threat of force is almost always there.

Politics is not exclusively about power. In the pages that follow, you will encounter plenty of people who have been driven to act politically for other reasons, including the desire to help the poor or to create a fairer society. There are also newer definitions of power that strip the necessity of coercion from it. However, as things stand now in most countries at most times, there is no escaping the connection between power and the ability to force adversaries to comply with one's wishes.

What Is the State?

That means that the state is the first term in this book that we need to define with some precision. Many people use the terms **government**, **state**, **nation**, and **regime** interchangeably. In some countries, like the United States, it may not be terribly inaccurate to do so. When we consider the former Soviet Union or Iraq before the 2003 war, however, treating the terms as synonyms can be extremely misleading.

The government refers to a particular set of institutions and people authorized by formal documents such as a constitution to pass laws, issue regulations, control the police, and so on. For the moment, it is enough to note that the government rarely holds all the power available in a given country and, in some cases, can be far less influential than other actors. That is certainly true of what are referred to as failed states, where the government lacks the ability to do much of anything in a society wracked by civil war. To a lesser degree, it was true of Mexico before the 2000 election, when the long dominant party, the PRI, was far more important than government institutions.

The state is a broader concept that includes all the institutions and individuals that exercise power. One of Putin's main accomplishments has been the sharp reduction in the political clout of that shadowy group of oligarchs, who had had tremendous leverage during the Yeltsin years and were unquestionably part of the state.

The regime refers to the institutions and practices that typically endure from government to government or, in American terms, administration to administration. This is, of course, a term that burst onto the political scene when President George W. Bush began demanding, and later forced, a regime change in Iraq. However, it should be noted that it is a concept political scientists have used for a half century or more.

The nation is a psychological rather than an institutional concept. It refers to the cultural, linguistic, and other identities that can tie people together. Thus, the Chechens who want to secede certainly do not think of themselves as Russians. Indeed, as we will see in several chapters, a lack of national identity often reflects deep-seated ethnic and other divisions that can undermine support for any state, whatever institutional levers it may have for exerting power.

Types of States

No two states are alike. Some, like the United States, are large, rich, stable, and powerful. Others, like Somalia, are so poor, fragile, and weak that a "state" can barely be said to exist. About the only thing all states have in common is that what each state does—and doesn't do—matters for its own citizens and for many others who live outside its borders.

Unfortunately, political scientists have still not reached agreement about the best way to classify states. Despite all the changes since the end of the cold war, I have decided to stick with a traditional three-way classification:

- Industrialized democracies
- Current and former Communist regimes
- Less developed countries

This way of dividing the world *is* outdated. Nonetheless, because the industrialized democracies and the once-solid Communist bloc each have many historical and contemporary traits in common, it still makes sense to use this framework.

The **industrialized democracies** present us with a paradox. On the one hand, they have the most resources and, so, the greatest potential for creating and sustaining powerful states. Like Great Britain, most are wealthy and have at least reasonably effective and popular political institutions. As table 1.1 (also on the inside front cover)

TABLE 1.1 Basic Data

COUNTRY	POPULATION IN MILLIONS	POPULATION GROWTH RATE (%)	GNP PER CAPITA PPP \$US	GNP GROWTH (2003–4)	ADULT LITERACY RATE	LIFE EXPECTANCY
Canada	32	0.9	30,600	2.0	99+	75
China	1,297	0.7	5,530	8.8	91	80
France	60	0.2	29,320	1.9	99+	79
Germany	83	0.1	30,130	1.5	99+	80
India	1,080	1.3	3,100	4.8	61	65
Iran	69	1.3	3,550	3.7	78	99+
Japan	128	0.2	30,040	1.2	81	99+
Mexico	104	1.4	9,300	2.8	90	73
Nigeria	140	2.4	930	1.1	45	67
Russia	143	-0.3	9,820	2.7	99+	65
South Africa	46	0.9	10,900	4.1	86	47
United Kingdom	59	0.2	31,400	3.0	99+	78
United States	295	1.0	39,710	3.4	99+	77
Low income countries	2,328	1.2	2,700	4.4	64	58
High income countries	1,001	0.7	30,970	2.8	99+	78

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report 2006*. Washington: The World Bank 2006.

shows, the citizens of industrialized democracies enjoy standards of living similar to those of most Americans. Virtually everyone can read and write, and the infant mortality figures suggest that they benefit from at least basic health-care coverage (except for the 47 million Americans who have no insurance).

On the other hand, these states also have the strongest built-in restraints on the use of power. Most of those limits on what leaders can do are laid out in constitutions and in laws. What the state can do is also determined to some degree by public opinion and by the results of competitive elections that determine who the leaders are.

That paradox is reversed in the current and former **Communist** states. During their heyday, their states were extremely strong. The government controlled almost everything, from the schools to the press to the economy. Indeed, the term totalitarianism was coined to describe these and other states that sought complete control over their societies.

The collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, however, demonstrated that repression and central control were not enough to keep these states strong indefinitely. Among the many causes of this historical turning point, we will focus on the failure of Soviet-style regimes to adopt economic policies that improved the well being of their citizens, which, in turn, reinforced the people's hostility toward regimes that suddenly lost most of their political clout. There were many reasons for this failure. At or near the top of any list is the decision by Soviet and Eastern European leaders to give their people more freedom in order to breathe new life into their economies. Once that happened, they could no

longer rely on repression, and they lost the political “glue” that kept them in power.

The Chinese have followed a different path, implementing liberal economic reforms while retaining tight control over political life. So far, this strategy has “worked” in that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is still in power and is presiding over one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world. However, most observers doubt that the CCP can continue stifling dissent indefinitely.

The **less developed countries (LDCs)** are much harder to describe as a whole, which is hardly surprising given that there are more than 130 of them. Above all else, they are poor. Some are so impoverished that the average citizen has no more than \$300 to \$500 a year to live on. Table 1.1 shows just how wide the gap is between the industrial democracies and the world's poorest countries. As the shortage of doctors, the large number of young people, and the high degree of illiteracy in the poorest countries suggest, their governments face far more problems than the other two types of states. To make matters even worse, many LDCs still have not been able to forge states with functioning courts, bureaucracies, and other institutions that people in the industrialized democracies take for granted. Many LDCs, too, have experienced military coups and other forms of political upheaval that have sapped a succession of regimes of the popular support vital to the long-term strength of any state.

There are exceptions to this otherwise gloomy picture—the **newly industrializing countries (NICs)**, which have made great strides in breaking out of the trap of underdevelopment. The most famous are the Asian tigers—South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia—as well

as a few other Asian countries and, perhaps, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. Although there is still some debate about what allowed these countries to grow so fast after the 1970s, every list of causes includes the way their states were able to build cooperative relationships with business and labor, albeit sometimes through force.

Strong and Weak States

We will also be asking why some states are stronger than others. Obviously, every state has tried to respond to the challenges it faces. Just as obviously, there is tremendous variation in what their leaders have been able to accomplish.

The distinction between strong and weak states is one of the most controversial in comparative politics. In a textbook for an introductory course, however, we can use a fairly simple definition. Strong states take on more responsibilities and generally carry them out more effectively than do weaker ones.

Comparativists have not been able to reach many conclusions about the factors that determine how strong a given state is. The best we can do is to note that, when viewed over the long term, strong states are relatively wealthy, their regimes have widespread popular support, and their governing elites work reasonably effectively together. The use of repression can strengthen states in the short run. However, as events of the past two decades suggest, it may not be enough to sustain such states under today's social and economic conditions.

Basic patterns in state structure and power roughly coincide with the three types of countries outlined above. In particular, the former Communist states could not adapt to the changing social and economic conditions they faced in the 1980s because their strength lay in their ability to maintain order, not innovate. Similarly, poverty, internal divisions, and other factors are part of the reason most less developed countries have relatively weak states.

No state comes close to being able to do whatever it wants whenever it wants. If anything, most states are losing the ability to shape their own destinies in the light of globalization, which we will consider shortly.

Finally, we will spend a lot of time on the distinction between the state and regime. In particular, we will see that industrialized democracies are able to weather most crises because there is all but total acceptance of the regime that insulates it from such divisive protests as those of the new left of the 1960s and 1970s. We will also see that most other regimes lack that bedrock popular support and that dissatisfaction with the government of the day more easily spills over to the regime and even, in some cases, to the existence of the country itself.

Key Concepts

This course is about countries and concepts.

If you want to truly understand what an introductory course in comparative politics is all about, focus on the concepts that will be raised in every chapter in the rest of the book.

Rather than repeat them here, focus on the key terms at the end of the chapter. After Chapter 1, I will focus on specific terms that are critical to that chapter.

Given the discussion of the *New York Times* and its masthead, it should already be clear that you need to focus on concepts as well as names, dates, places, and events to master comparative politics.

Each chapter will have a box that draws your attention to the key concepts raised in it, all of which will also appear in the glossary.

For this chapter, concentrate on the following:

- Historically, how did the wrenching processes of state and nation building shape the countries covered in the rest of the book? Ask the same about the impact of imperialism over the last few centuries and globalization today.
- How do people and the institutions they form try to shape decision making? How does the structure of the state affect their efforts?
- We will soon be in the second decade of the twenty first century. Think about how the concepts discussed in the rest of this chapter will help you understand politics in the awkwardly labeled twenty teens, in other words the decade during which most of you will have graduated.

Other Core Concepts

The state will not be the only concept we focus on. Most of the others, however, are based on issues that eddy out of the state and its actions. More importantly yet, if you do not master these concepts as well as the state, you will have a hard time understanding the mass of facts in the rest of the book.

Sometimes, we will use a concept in slightly different ways, which is why I am returning to three of the ones introduced earlier. The **government** can also be used to refer to the people in power at the moment, what Americans often call the administration. Obviously, the government is important. In addition, we will look at countries on two other levels. First is the **regime**, which is the set of institutions and practices that endures when one government is replaced by another. In established democracy, much of the regime is defined by the constitution and other major laws. During the communist era, the constitution was an all but meaningless document. The regime was created and controlled by the communist party. Second, we have to consider the **system**—another term we will use in

two ways (see the section on templates below). In many countries, people challenge the regime as well as the government of the day. In some, they go farther and question whether the country as a whole—the system itself—should continue to exist. Thus, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it was not just the regime that disappeared. The country itself split into fifteen new independent states.

Most chapters, though not all, will examine the interplay between **democracy** and **capitalism**. Modern capitalism and democracy began to take hold at about the same time. Indeed, the American colonies declared their independence the same year that Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations*, the first great text on capitalist economics. As we will see, neither emerged easily anywhere and both exist in multiple forms. Finally, we will see that countries outside of Europe and North America are still struggling to democratize and create functioning market-based economies.

Whatever a country's type of political system, it will have a **political culture** that reflects the core values of its people. Political scientists rarely consider attitudes toward current leaders or issues as part of a country's culture. Rather, they focus on enduring opinions about a country's institutions and political practices. In many countries, much of the culture revolved around people's **identity** or how they define themselves in racial, linguistic, ethnic, or religious terms. Today, identity issues are among the most controversial in the most divided countries.

Countries also provide their people with opportunities for **political participation**. These opportunities vary as well. In the established democracies, people are free to vote in competitive elections, join interest groups that lobby on their behalf, and engage in at least peaceful protest. In authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, such opportunities rarely exist. Instead, the regime often goads people into forms of political behavior the regime approves of, something we will see most notably in Iran and China.

All states also make **public policy** that tries to shape how countries deal with political issues. Policies can regulate what citizens can do, as was reflected in the examples of driving speed and drinking age rules later. Those examples also tell us that states are not always all that effective in carrying out regulations. Policies can distribute or redistribute resources. I almost certainly pay more in taxes than you do. And, some of my taxes go to support students at the state universities here in Virginia that have some of the lowest tuition rates in the country. Other policies shift resources from wealthier to poorer people as in what are loosely known as welfare programs. Yet others transfer money and services across generational lines, something that will increasingly happen in the industrialized democracies as my generation of baby boomers retires and incurs ever higher health care costs. Put simply, your generation will increasingly pay for mine even if we can solve the pension and health care coverage policies that bedevil every country. Finally, policies can be symbolic,




Image not available due to copyright restrictions

for instance when political leaders only wear traditional clothing, drape themselves in flags, or have themselves driven in cars manufactured in their own countries.

Finally, there are a number of historical concepts, beginning with **imperialism**. From the end of the fifteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans took over much of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. It is hard to overestimate the impact imperialism had on the peoples who suddenly were colonized. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, colonists and their descendants came close to destroying the indigenous population while taking over huge amounts of land. Elsewhere, the imperial powers redrew boundaries, often putting people who had been historical antagonists in the same jurisdiction. Often, too, they tried to impose their religions, cultures, and forms of government on people who found all three alien.

More recently, the political tensions and violence of the twentieth century still have a tremendous impact. One scholar estimates that as many as 100 million people died as a result of war and other forms of political violence. Political scientists coined the term **totalitarianism** to describe the most vicious of those regimes including Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. The **cold war** of the second half of the last century may be over, but it still has massive consequences for much of the world, especially those countries that were and/or still are under communist rule.



The second World Trade Center tower, hit by a hijacked airplane on September 11.

Today, one of the “hottest” and most controversial topics in political science is **globalization**, which refers to the rapid shrinking of social, economic, environmental, and political life. The world itself is not physically shrinking, of course. Nonetheless, advances in communication, travel, information technology, and much more have made it easier and easier for people to work with—and against—each other. This is happening so fast that Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times* entitled his most recent book, *The World Is Flat*.

Globalization is contentious, but is it beneficial or harmful? It probably depends on the parts of the world and the kinds of people you focus on. Certainly, software engineers in the United States and India have done very well as a result. But textile workers in the United States have been all but wiped out. Obviously, the most visible and tragic example of the world we live in are the terrorist attacks of 2001 that destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and damaged parts of the Pentagon in Washington.

THREE TEMPLATES


The comparative method can be a powerful tool. Comparison, however, is not powerful enough on its own to lead us to the kinds of overarching conclusions mentioned previously. We also have to know what to compare, what questions to ask, and which criteria to use in evaluating the evidence we uncover.

Most political scientists believe that theories best provide that focus. Unfortunately, comparative politics is not chemistry, physics, or microeconomics, each of which has a paradigm that structures everything from cutting-edge research to introductory textbooks. The best tools available to us are less powerful models that only allow us to see how the various components of a state are related to one another.

Think of models as equivalent to the templates for typical, routine tasks that computer companies provide when you buy their software. The three of them that follow weave together most of the themes discussed so far in this chapter and therefore will also help you revisit the concepts you need for the rest of the book.

The Political System

The chapters on individual countries are organized around a model known as systems theory. (See figure 1.1.) Although most of the natural sciences are based on it, systems theory is no longer very popular in political science. Nonetheless, it is more useful for our purposes than its intellectual compet-

FIGURE 1.1 The Political System

itors because it allows us to see how a state's components interact over time and how nonpolitical and international forces shape what it can and cannot accomplish.

Systems theory revolves around five concepts: inputs, decision making, outputs, feedback, and the environment. **Inputs** are the ways average citizens and the groups they form engage in political life. David Easton, who adapted systems theory to political science, divided them into two types of activities: those that **support** and those that place **demands** on the state. Both come in many forms.

Individuals can act on their own by, for example, voting or writing a letter to the editor. However, most political activity, especially that of a demanding nature, is channeled through two types of organizations: **interest groups** and **political parties**. Interest groups typically deal with a limited range of issues and represent a narrow segment of a country's population. Examples include trade unions, business associations, and environmental groups that organize and "lobby" around specific issues and other concerns. A political party, in contrast, tries to bring the interests of a number of groups together and to gain control over the government either on its own or in a coalition. A party need not build its support or power largely, or even primarily, through elections, as was the case in the former Soviet Union or under the Baath Party regime in Iraq.

The conventional wisdom is that British interest groups are weaker than American ones because it is

harder to lobby effectively in a parliamentary system than in a presidential one, something we will explore in the next three chapters. Nonetheless, the Labour Party has traditionally done well at the polls because of its close ties to the Trade Unions Congress, which helped create the party in the first place and is still an integral part of its organization. On the other hand, the opposition Conservative Party has close links to the major business and trade associations.

Sometimes demands go beyond the conventional "inside-the-system" activities of interest groups and political parties. Protesters, for instance, tried to disrupt President Bush's state visit to London in late 2003.

More to the point, Chechen rebels have fought two wars in a thus far vain attempt to win their independence from Russia. But there is no better example of "outside-the-system" protest than the attacks on 9/11. Analysts will long debate what motivated the nineteen hijackers and their supporters. However, there seems little doubt that their faith and their hatred of Western politics and policies led them to be willing to take not only their own lives but those of thousands of people in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the four airplanes.

Political participation is also shaped by a country's **political culture**. In addition to the features mentioned above, a culture reflects the impact of history on a society's beliefs. In Great Britain, the legacy of feudalism remains (albeit faintly) in the willingness of some working-class voters to trust their "social betters" with roots in the aristocracy. The widespread support of Shiite Islam is an important value supporting the continued rule of the Islamic Republic in Iran. Russians' values today are in large part shaped by more than seventy years of Communist rule. Finally, the Chechen case also shows us that not all countries are homogeneous and that some have strikingly different subcultures.

Easton's second main concept, **decision making**, covers the same intellectual ground as the state, and thus does not need much elaboration here. It is enough to note that we will examine states from two main angles: the structure of their institutions and the values, skills, and personalities of their leaders. Institutions matter more in older, established regimes like Britain's even though it does not have a written constitution. That is less the case in a country like Iran, where the ruling clerics often do political end runs around the elected institutions they created or in Russia, where the institutions are barely a decade old and could well change dramatically if the October 2007 predictions about Putin's plans to become prime minister hold true.

Inputs and decision making are important in their own right. However, their importance grows when we take the

next step and explore what those decisions lead to—the system’s **output** or **public policy** along the three lines discussed in the previous section.

The most common type of policy regulates the behavior of individuals or organizations. Thus, Britain is struggling to find new ways of managing the constant traffic jams in its old cities by introducing tolls that drivers pay to enter them.

Other policies redistribute resources, sometimes to such a degree that they alter a society’s basic patterns of wealth and power. That, of course, has always been the goal of Marxists and other socialists. But even with the growing support for market economies, states are still heavily involved in distributional politics. In Iran, the authorities have channeled billions of dollars to companies and foundations they control in order to shape the way the country’s economy modernizes.

Policies can also be symbolic. Under both Yeltsin and Putin, the Russian government has tried to build support for the symbols pegged to a new state, including adopting a new national anthem. Even more obvious on this score is the fact that the Islamic Republic changed both Iran’s flag and its national anthem when it came to power in 1979 to reflect its commitment to theological orthodoxy. By contrast, despite its long-standing disputes with the United States, it not only allowed a team of American wrestlers to compete in the world championships in Tehran in 1998, it encouraged its fans to cheer the team when it paraded around the arena waving the stars and stripes.

Systems analysis is also the most useful model for our purposes because it incorporates **feedback**, which is the process through which people find out about public policy and the ways in which their reactions to recent political events help shape the next phase of political life. Sometimes a decision directly affects an individual or group. More often, people only learn about a policy indirectly, either through the media or by word of mouth.

In each of the countries we will be covering in this book, the media play a powerful and frequently quite biased role in political life, either in supporting the state or in criticizing its policies. There are times, too, when people do not find out about state policies at all, which can result either from conscious attempts to keep these policies secret or from public apathy.

Feedback makes systems analysis particularly useful, because it forces us to concentrate on how a system changes over time. Too many of the other models political scientists use provide the intellectual equivalent of snapshots that show what a system is like during a relatively brief period. Focusing on feedback, however, draws

our attention to how the entire system has evolved over the years, thus turning the snapshot into the intellectual equivalent of a DVD.

Here, of course, the media play a critical role. Britain’s BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) is renowned for the quality and impartiality of its coverage. By contrast, Putin has been taken to task for his decisions to take away the licenses for all television stations that are not under government control. On the other end of the spectrum, the Iranian authorities are struggling to control access to television stations run by emigrés, which hundreds of thousands of people watch on nominally illegal satellite dishes.

The environment includes everything lying outside the political system. Systems are defined as being “bounded” or having an autonomous identity and organization. No system, however, is completely autonomous. All politicians and citizens must react to forces beyond their control. There are three types of forces that can limit—sometimes sharply—their ability to shape their own destinies.

The first is the impact of history on culture and politics in general discussed earlier. No country’s history completely shapes what happens today. However, it does partially set the political stage, determining what is and is not likely to work. Second are the limits imposed by domestic social, economic, and physical conditions including Britain’s innovative plan to force people who want to drive into central London to pay for the privilege. Finally, and today perhaps most importantly, there are the global forces that arise outside a country’s border. Sometimes their impact is hard to miss, as when British and American forces invaded and occupied Iraq. Other times they are far harder to document, as when global media conglomerates assume control of a country’s television stations and other outlets. Sometimes they can have massive consequences, as did the introduction of the euro in 2002.

Historical and Contemporary Factors

Table 1.2 draws our attention to four types of forces that have largely determined the basic patterns of politics in all countries. The first row of the table highlights the historical forces that set the stage for the “dramas” of global

TABLE 1.2 Factors Affecting the Development of States

	INTERNATIONAL	DOMESTIC
Historical	Imperialism	State and nation building
Contemporary	Globalization and the end of the cold war	Pressures from below

political life today. Undoubtedly, the most important is **imperialism**, which led to the imposition of Western political, economic, and cultural institutions on the rest of the world. For example, although Iran was never formally colonized, the West had a profound and negative impact on its society and economy.

Opposition to Western influence, for instance, had a lot to do with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979. More generally, to this day, many former colonies are desperately poor and dependent on the policies and practices of the wealthy states and private corporations in the “north.” Imperialism was also important in determining how the state itself was formed and then spread around the world.

What’s more, the modern state is largely a byproduct of imperialism. Prior to the 1600s, the European monarchies were weak and decentralized. But the decision to expand abroad meant they needed more powerful states that could raise armies and feed, equip, and pay them.

State building never occurred smoothly. Everywhere, the growing power of the state left lasting scars. It was particularly difficult when one or both of two problems arose. First, when the state developed quickly, antagonisms arose toward a government that all of a sudden demanded more of its people. Second, when minority ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups were forcibly incorporated into the emerging state, this tended to produce tensions that undermined the state’s ability to govern.

When the imperialist powers carved up the Southern Hemisphere, they did so largely for their own reasons, ignoring traditional boundaries and lumping together groups that had historically been antagonistic toward each other. As a result, new states such as Angola, Afghanistan, and Nigeria faced deeply rooted ethnic tensions, which made it all but impossible for leaders to agree on anything.

As a result, the difficulties associated with state building have been particularly pronounced in the less developed world. Gaining independence usually involved an intense struggle with the old imperial power. When the conflict was especially prolonged or violent, as in Vietnam or Algeria, the new nation found itself physically and economically drained once it finally won independence.

As the second row in table 1.2 suggests, you cannot understand everything about political life today merely by putting it into historical perspective. If you could, there would be little reason to take a course such as this one or to want to change a world whose basic contours are already set!

The most important contemporary global force remains the cold war between the United States and the for-

mer Soviet Union. The two countries emerged from World War II as the most dominant powers on earth, ushering in an unprecedented period in which a pair of superpowers shaped the destinies of almost every other country.

As the United States and the Soviet Union jockeyed for position, regional problems became global ones as well. When the superpowers’ interests collided most directly, countries such as Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan paid the price. Even such regional powers as Japan, Britain, Poland, Hungary, and the two Germanys saw their freedom to maneuver limited by the superpowers.

Now that the cold war is over, no one is quite sure how those international forces will play out. Some observers think supranational institutions like the United Nations or the European Union will play a larger and more constructive role in finding peaceful resolutions to the conflicts that still plague international and domestic political life. Others are more skeptical. Optimists thought the global shock wave caused by the attacks of 9/11 would unite the international community and go a long way toward eradicating terrorism once and for all. Pessimists worry that the subsequent wars and the upsurge in terrorist activities will only sow the seeds for more, bloodier violence in the future.

No one, however, doubts that international political forces will remain an important determinant of domestic events around the world. Since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973–1974 and the economic downturn that followed, we have become aware of another global force limiting what individual states can do—the **international political economy (IPE)**, which is the term political scientists use to describe trade and other interactions that take place between countries. To some degree, the IPE is a legacy of imperialism. But as we are all painfully aware from the daily news reports about the loss of American factory jobs and the destruction of the Brazilian rain forest, the IPE has taken on a life of its own.

The countries that are suffering as a result of globalization are indeed in a difficult bind. How can the poorest nations break out of their poverty when those international dynamics are leaving them even further behind? How can countries as different as Mexico, Poland, and the United States solve their domestic problems when they owe billions of dollars to other governments and private financiers? How can a country like Brazil balance the needs of the environment with those of its impoverished citizens?

Finally, there is the traditional subject matter of comparative politics—what is happening within individual countries today. Because of what occurred in the past and

because of what is taking place now outside their borders, few states are as fully masters of their own destinies as they were even a generation ago. Conversely, no state is completely at the mercy of globalization, although some states are better able to shape their future than others.


State, Society, and Globalization

We can work through the third template quickly because figure 1.2 covers many of the phenomena discussed already. What makes this template different is its focus on the causal links among three key factors you can use to help stitch the pieces of this book together.

At least since Thomas Hobbes wrote in the seventeenth century, most political theorists have pointed out that individuals and the groups they form tend to seek ever more freedom and power. The more pessimistic of them have feared that people motivated by such self-interest would tear society apart if left to their own devices. Thus, like it or not, we have to create states to maintain order by keeping these centrifugal forces in check.

As a result, most political scientists believe that state and society exist in what they call an inverse relationship. For the power of one to increase, that of the other must be reduced. For example, when the Republicans took control of both houses of Congress in 1994, they were convinced that the way to give average Americans more power was to limit the jurisdiction of what they believed was a far too dominant state. Similarly, the creation of the National Health Service in Great Britain in 1948 left doctors less free to practice medicine as they saw fit and left affluent patients less able to choose their own health-care options than they had been before.

FIGURE 1.2 The Impact of Global and Domestic Forces on the State



Moreover, this inverse relationship seems to hold across all types of political systems. Giving more power to Soviet citizens in the 1980s came at the expense of the state and contributed to its collapse. It also draws our attention to the way globalization is reshaping political life by reducing the real ability of states to make and implement economic policy. Although international institutions such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund play a critical role in this respect, rarely can we pinpoint exactly how such influence is wielded, because these pressures are far subtler than those used by the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terrorism. Nonetheless, they are real and important enough that they may force us to change the ways in which we view global political life both as academics and as average citizens.

A WORLD IN CRISIS?

It should be clear already that we live in a troubled world. Every country we will cover faces major problems, some of which could have disastrous consequences.

That leads many of my own students to think that we live in a crisis-riddled world. Maybe so. But I then try to show them that crisis does not necessarily mean that political life is a disaster waiting to happen which is how we typically use that term in the West.

The ancient Chinese developed their language using characters or modified pictures instead of what we think of as an alphabet. The two they brought together to render what we mean by crisis includes the notion of danger, which is so central to western thought, but also opportunity.

The first sixteen chapters of this book will focus on the dangers. The last one will draw your attention to the opportunities. It will draw heavily on the work my colleagues and I do as conflict resolution and peace building practitioners, and will stress the need to “think outside the box,” as the cliché has it.

USING THIS BOOK

You are at the beginning of what will be a typical introductory course with a typical textbook, at least at first glance. However, to fully master the material, you will have to go beyond the typical, because you will constantly be confronted with controversial questions that do not have clear and obvious answers but will have a direct bearing on your life for years to come.

In short, you will have to do more than merely memorize the notes you take in class or the key points you high-

light throughout these pages. Courses that deal with new, complex, and controversial subjects succeed only when students stretch themselves to consider unsettling ideas, question their basic assumptions, and sift through evidence to reach their own conclusions. Therefore, if you are going to truly master the material, you have to take to heart the advice of the French novelist Marcel Proust that begins this chapter. You will be seeing new lands in Proust's terms, especially the less developed countries, because much of this book and your course will focus on places you do not know much about. But, if Proust is right, you will not get very far in this voyage of discovery unless you also try to see these lands through what will be the new "eyes" of comparative politics.

This book has a number of features that make the "active learning" side of the course as useful (and, I hope, as enjoyable) as possible, beginning with the structure of the book itself. The core of the book covers politics in the three kinds of states mentioned earlier—industrialized democracies, current and former Communist regimes, and the third world. Each part begins with an overview chapter that explores the key trends, theories, and ideas about that type of state. The rest of the part is devoted to case studies of countries that exemplify the different aspects of that particular type of state. The countries discussed in this book were chosen because they are important in their own right and because you can use them as intellectual springboards for reaching more general conclusions about the political trends (re)shaping our world.

They are organized as follows:

- **Industrialized democracies:** the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, the European Union
- **Current and former Communist regimes:** Russia, China
- **The less developed world:** India, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Mexico

Additional chapters on Canada, Japan, and South Africa can be found at the Book Companion Website: academic.cengage.com/polsci/Hauss/GlobalChallenges6e.

Because this book focuses on countries and individual instructors assign various subsets of them in their classes, it is hard to build comparative analysis into the text itself. However, the boxes on core concepts will be explicitly comparative. So too will be the boxes on HIV/AIDS policy that will also appear in each country chapter. HIV/AIDS is an important issue in and of itself. But it is also a useful vehicle for comparative analysis, because the way a country has responded to the greatest health crisis in

generations tells us a lot about how its political system as a whole operates.

Key Terms

Cold war	Nation
Communist	Newly industrialized countries (NICs)
Constitution	Output
Crisis	Political culture
Decision making	Political party
Demand	Politics
Democratization	Power
Environment	Public policy
Feedback	Regime
Globalization	State
Government	Strong state
Imperialism	Support
Industrialized democracy	Systems theory
Input	Third world
Interest group	Totalitarianism
International political economy (IPE)	Weak state
Less Developed Countries (LDC)	

Critical Thinking Exercises

- 1 Much has changed since this book was finished in mid 2007. Do the various assertions made in this chapter still make sense? In what ways? Why (not)?
- 2 Public opinion pollsters routinely ask whether people think the country is heading in the "right" direction or "is on the wrong track." If you were asked such a question about politics in the world as a whole, how would you answer? Why did you reach that conclusion?
- 3 Take your campus, community, or state, and analyze it using the three templates. What new insights did this exercise lead you to? What, if any, important facts, trends, or institutions were left out of the analysis?
- 4 Of all the concepts covered in this chapter, which do you think are the most and the least important? Why did you reach this conclusion?
- 5 You could interpret this chapter as arguing that it is becoming harder for governments to govern effectively. Do you agree? Why (not)?



Useful Websites

The Internet has become an essential tool for students of comparative politics. There are not many sites dedicated to comparative politics per se. However, the Internet is filled

with information on specific countries, individuals, and issues. In particular, because so many newspapers, radio and television networks, and news services have gone online, it is easy to keep up with breaking news and evolving trends around the world.

That said, the Internet is increasingly hard to use because there are so many sites, and even the best search engines can catalogue only a tiny fraction of them. Therefore, I have included links to what I think are the best sites for the issues and countries covered in this book, updates on the countries, sources of statistical and other data, and quizzes on each chapter so you can gauge how well you have mastered the material. You can also e-mail me with questions about the book or issues that have arisen in your own course.

It is located at:

academic.cengage.com/polsci/Hauss/GlobalChallenges6e.

Each chapter includes a section like this one with web addresses to portals and other general sites. Specific websites will be inserted in the text the first time an institution or individual is mentioned, as was the case with the brief biography of Putin earlier in this chapter.

There are other good resources for comparative politics. Here are three general sites that divide up the field in different but useful ways from the Universities of Colorado, Keele, and West Virginia, respectively:

sobek.colorado.edu/POLSCI/RES/comp.html

www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area.htm

www.polsci.wvu.edu/PolyCy/pscomp.html

The Internet also has dozens of sources providing basic data on countries that take you far beyond what can be covered in a single book and that include material on events occurring after this book was published. The CIA Factbook is a treasure trove of information about the world's countries and is updated quite frequently. The other two sources are the work of international "open source" teams of men and women willing to volunteer their time to provide general information about countries in general and elections in particular. The final one is the best source on election results. Many academics don't like Wikipedia, but this site existed long before wikis were invented and was folded into it because its author believes in open source.

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

www.adminet.com

www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld

Finally, it is important to keep up with the news in any course on comparative politics and international relations. At this point, all of the world's major newspapers, news services, and broadcast media put much of their material on the web. Many, however, take the postings down after a week or two. The BBC and CNN have searchable data bases for their coverage, including items that never made it on air. That said, their coverage on third world issues is not great. Therefore, I also frequently look at One World, which is a good source for that part of the planet.

www.cnn.com

news.bbc.co.uk

www.oneworld.net

Further Reading

Almond, Gabriel, and G. Bingham Powell. *Comparative Politics: System, Policy, and Process*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. Dated, but still the best presentation of the classic approach to comparative politics.

Ambrose, Stephen, with Douglas Brinkley. *The Rise to Globalism*, 8th ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. The best short volume outlining global history since World War II.

Friedman, Tom. *The World Is Flat*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2006. The most influential and controversial book on globalization.

Lane, Ruth. *The Art of Comparative Politics*. Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn & Bacon, 1997. One of the few recent books arguing that comparativists have made substantial progress.

Lim, Timothy, *Doing Comparative Politics*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2006. A rather abstract book aimed more at grad students than undergrads, but explores three key concepts: rational choice, institutions, and culture.

Mayer, Lawrence, *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory and Explanation*. Sloan Publications. Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY: 2006.

O'Neill, Patrick, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton. Like Lim's book, written for undergraduates but probably better for upper level undergrads or grad students.

Peters, B. Guy. *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*. New York: New York University Press, 1998. The one recent attempt to make sense of the entire field of comparative politics by one of the most prolific scholars of the past thirty years.

Soe, Christian, ed. *Comparative Politics: Annual Editions*. Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill,

published annually. A collection of recent articles from the press.

Stepan, Alfred. *Arguing Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. A collection of essays by one of the few leading scholars in comparative politics willing to take on most issues and most regions.

Zahariades, Nikolaos. *Theory, Concepts, and Method in Comparative Politics*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996. One of the few attempts to update the ideas of comparative politics since the 1960s.



